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BOOK REVIEW
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE. Edited by
David Kairys. New York, Pantheon Books 1982. Pp. ix + 321.
Paperback. $9.95.
Reviewed by John Holly III*
A reader who is in the mood for light, uncontroversial
material should not sit down with The Politics of Law,1 a col-
lection of thought-provoking essays on the American legal sys-
tem. The genesis of the book is the Theoretical Studies Com-
mittee of the National Lawyer's Guild. The perspective is
leftist, often Marxist; the tone often combative. The essential
message is that capitalism has gutted the ideals of the Ameri-
can law by converting all aspects of human life into dollars
and cents, and by exalting individualism over social justice.
One hopes that more than a few practitioners will read
this book. In the context of legal practice, every attorney
makes choices about goals and tactics. Such choices are
grounded in the attorney's own values. These essays can pro-
vide needed perspective on commonly held values by chal-
lenging basic assumptions and by exposing some of the conse-
quences of legal choices. For any attorney whose practice
expresses his or her values, this book will provide a stimulat-
ing, rewarding experience.
The book also offers superb material for the classroom.
One example is Duncan Kennedy's "Legal Education As A
Training For Hierarchy,"' a denunciation of white, male pre-
dominance in law school. According to Kennedy, law students
are shown that passivity and deference are virtues, and that
emotional content in learning is not suited to the rational
analysis of law. Professors and employers model this hierarchy
o 1983 by John Holly Ill.
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1. THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
2. Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW, supra note 1, at 40.
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of values for students who will, in later years, relate similarly
as senior partners and judges.'
Kennedy points out that a major function of law school is
to provide unskilled labor for the organized bar. Students are
ranked into a hierarchy without regard to the goal of compe-
tent legal practice. Since they are not equipped for many vari-
eties of law practice, students are expected to scramble to find
places within a hierarchy of conventional law firms in order to
obtain necessary training.4 The value of exposing students to
Kennedy's ideas is that he asks important questions about
personal values. This inquiry could help stave off boredom
and cynicism, and some law professors might actually enjoy
teaching more if fewer students were bored and cynical.
The purpose of this book is to connect the legal system to
the wider political-economic context of American life. The
values of the legal system permeate every social institution.
Such basic concepts as "person," "property," and "govern-
ment" are defined through the law. Implicit in these defini-
tions is the ideology of American life; the authors assume that
the values of the dominant class adopt only enough change to
placate subordinate classes. As editor Kairys notes, "[tihe law
is a major vehicle for the maintenance of existing social and
power relations by the consent or acquiescence of the lower
and middle classes."
The methods used by American law to legitimate the sta-
tus quo have evolved over time, and are chronicled by Eliza-
beth Mensch in her essay, "History of Mainstream Legal
Thought."6 Beginning from the foundation of the natural law,
Mensch observes that legal thinkers coined the concept of
utility in order to accommodate the industrial revolution.
Then, in the late nineteenth century, judges created an analy-
sis "premised on private rights and strictly limited public
powers, '" 7 which helped to restrain populist and progressive
reforms.
Mensch goes on to note that this objective analysis was
attacked after World War I by those known as legal realists.
3. Id. at 59.
4. Id. at 52.
5. Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITCS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 5.
6. Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW, supra note 1, at 18.
7. Id. at 24.
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The realists pointed out that every private right upheld by a
court is a grant of public power. The emphasis, according to
the realists, should be the social and historical context of the
law. Contemporary judges are heirs to this tradition of accom-
modation followed by rigidity and formalism. The modern so-
lution is to concentrate on the "process" by which rights and
duties are defined. The goal is to make the process live up to
the reasonable expectations of the parties."
Mensch has written an extremely good but unsympa-
thetic history. She sees the major function of American law as
a bludgeon to be used by the powerful against the powerless.9
Unfortunately, she does not resolve the tension between sta-
bility and the reality of change, so her criticism runs shallow.
Seeming not to appreciate the human dimension of the law,
perhaps Mensch fears that such appreciation would lead to an
apology for what she can only see as exploitation and
oppression.
In contrast to Mensch, Victor Rabinowitz in his essay,
"The Radical Tradition In The Law," 10 accepts that humans
are far from perfect and that legal systems are human cre-
ations. Unlike Mensch, he explicitly states his basic assump-
tions, so the reader can always understand his perspective. A
final contrast with Mensch is that Rabinowitz is an optimist.
He sees the law as a positive force which can inspire a vision
of social justice and can lead to an improvement in people's
lives.1"
One of Rabinowitz's basic assumptions is that "[n]o soci-
ety of even moderate complexity, whether it be feudal, capi-
talist or socialist, can exist without law."1 2 Further,"[a]ll sys-
tems of law are constructed to protect the state and its
economic base."'13 Law, therefore, is necessary, and necessarily
related to the economic system. But the law can develop inde-
pendently of economics because people yearn for "a better,
more rational, and more bearable existence .... "" This
8. Id. at 26-29.
9. Id. at 20.
10. Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition in the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 310.
11. Id. at 317-18.
12. Id. at 312.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 317.
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yearning pressures the state to limit its own power in the in-
terest of stability. With the state limiting its powers, progress
can be made toward legal equality and fairness.
Lawyers can be part of this progress according to Rabino-
witz. But the law, and lawyers, cannot be the only answers.
Achieving the goals of a socialist state has never been an ob-
ject of American law. Such changes can only "be brought
about by extra-legal means." 15 So Rabinowitz adopts a moder-
ate approach to the role of the radical lawyer. He does not
expect miracles, but he affirms that positive change has oc-
curred. And, best of all, he proposes a course of action for
lawyers:
We can do our best to keep radical activists out of jail
and on the streets. We can seek to extend to their ulti-
mate limits the rights of free speech, due process, free-
dom from unreasonable searches ... to make more possi-
ble changes in our economic system. We can expose police
abuse and protect the right of privacy, both in political
and personal affairs. . . . We can . . . join . . . in the
struggle for the establishment of democracy in the trade
unions.106
The fact that Rabinowitz, unlike Mensch, offers a plan of
action can be attributed to his acceptance of human imperfec-
tion and his optimism toward future change. Rabinowitz ap-
pears to have found a way to be an idealist in touch with real-
ity. As such, he provides an approach to the rest of the book.
"A realistic . . . approach to the law . . . must acknowl-
edge the fundamental conflicts in society," such as class, race,
and sex.17 The relative impact of these conflicts can be seen in
the better essays in the collection. These essays organize dis-
parate facts into a coherent picture, offer plausible explana-
tions of current events, and point the way toward progressive
change.
For example, the legal system has attempted to resolve
the antagonism between the sexes in varying ways throughout
American history. One constant factor has been the oppres-
sion of women which "has changed historically in a dialectical
relationship to changes in economic and social development
15. Id. at 315.
16. Id. at 317-18.
17. Kairys, supra note 5, at 6.
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and . . .the role of the family."' 8
The current state of the law, say Nadine Taub and Eliza-
beth Schneider, 19 relies on the fact that only women can be-
come pregnant to justify differential legal treatment. Two Su-
preme Court cases, Geduldig v. Aieo11 20 and Michael M. v.
Superior Court,21 are used to illustrate this point. In
Geduldig, the Court upheld the exclusion of pregnancy from
coverage by worker's temporary disability insurance. In
Michael M., the Court upheld the exclusion of women from
punishment under statutory rape laws.
Taub and Schneider observe that workers are often de-
nied full employment benefits. Because of pregnancy, it ap-
pears that young women can be held to a lesser standard of
responsibility than young men. It is important to see that
these two ideas reinforce one another. Denying women equal
employment benefits appears to be justified because they do
not have to bear equal burdens of responsibility. 22 Exploita-
tion is justified in the law by the results of exploitation.
This same type of legal analysis is applied to race rela-
tions in two well-written essays by W. Hayward Burns23 and
Alan Freeman.2 Both observe that, although Brown v. Board
of Education25 removed legal support for the white supremist
doctrine of "separate but equal" from governmentally sanc-
tioned classifications, an equally pernicious myth which
promises "equality of opportunity" holds sway among our
largely non-white underclass today. This new myth allows
some modern Americans to be born into advantage without a
corresponding personal sense of social obligation, while other
citizens born into disadvantage internalize a personal sense of
failure.2 a The Burger Court, says Freeman, allows a remedy
18. Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 296 (footnote omitted).
19. Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination, in THE POLrr-
ICS OF LAW, supra note at 117.
20. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
21. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
22. See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)(male only draft registra-
tion does not violate equal protection).
23. Burns, Law and Race in America, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 1, at
89.
24. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW, supra note 1, at 96.
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. "Blacks posted gains in home ownership, education, and voter registration
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for racism only when an intentional perpetration of racism
can be identified. This approach allows all those not labeled
as perpetrators to successfully avoid liability and to disassoci-
ate themselves from racial problems.2 7
Another major theme of The Politics of Law is that the
law promotes capitalist values. Victor Rabinowitz's assump-
tion that law protects the economic base of society is explored
in essays which examine the interaction of capitalism with
American law.2 8 The core values of capitalism, according to
economist Robert Heilbroner, incorporate a basically uncon-
trolled market system and rest on the private ownership of
the means of production. These values protect the class which
currently owns society's productive assets. "Certainly capital-
ism aims at the material well-being of its constituents, but
equally certainly it entertains no thought that the pursuit of
well-being will alter the basic class character of the system
... ," Several essays provide significant insight into the in-
teraction between law and capitalism.
In "Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law"80 the au-
thor, Karl Klare, says that the law has improved to the point
of codifying procedural equality between the labor force and
those who represent capital. But the law also supports sub-
stantive inequalities which reflect social inequities. Procedural
equality, states Klare, is found in the reciprocal promises by
which labor promises not to strike and capital agrees to sub-
mit to arbitration of grievances. The substantive inequality is
that the union's promise not to strike is absolute, but capital
owners can exempt certain issues from arbitration. By exam-
ining those issues which are kept from arbitration, Klare
reveals the underlying values of labor law.
For instance, Klare postulates that capital owners regard
the labor business exclusively as the sale of labor as a com-
modity, like rubber, steel, or cement. A complementary postu-
in the 1970's, but black unemployment soared 140 percent and poverty continued
[steady at 34 percent]." Census Bureau, America's Black Population: 1970 to 1982,
San Jose News, Aug. 22, 1983, at 4A, col. 2.
27. Freeman, supra note 24, at 98-99.
28. Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition in the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 312.
29. R. HEILBRONER, Reflections on the Future of Socialism, in BETWEEN CAPI-
TALISM AND SOCIALISM, 79, 81 (1970).
30. Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE PoLmcs oF LAW,
supra note 1, at 65.
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lation is that workers make no recognizable investment in a
company. A second primary concern of the existing capital
forces is that the unrestricted freedom of capital owners to
invest must be protected and enhanced. A third concern of
the existing capitalists identified by Klare is that the work-
place must embody a social hierarchy, with capital at the top
and labor at the bottom.81
These values ignore the fact that labor is provided by
thinking, feeling, human beings. People build homes, schools,
churches, and playgrounds to form a community near their
workplaces. This is truly an investment of financial and emo-
tional resources. The fact that a community could be destoyed
by a plant shut-down or a pollution spill supports the conclu-
sion that the interests of workers run more deeply than is
presently recognized by our existing body of labor law. The
fact that worker's taxes contribute to bail out a company like
Chrysler and to buy a nationally owned space shuttle from
Lockheed shows that workers, too, have a political stake in
corporate decisions. Author Klare proposes to expand the
scope of labor's involvement in the decision-making process to
include new notions about the content and purpose of work
and to revamp the allocation of social resources.3 2 For Klare,
labor law is one arena in which the evolution to greater
human freedom should take place by reordering the existing
hierarchy.
To continue the iconoclastic tenor of The Politics of Law,
an extremely cogent analysis of capitalism, crime, and police
conduct is presented by Mark Kelman in his essay "The Ori-
gins of Crime and Criminal Violence." 88 Kelman reviews and
compares both the traditional mainstream and traditional
radical views of the origins of crime. Traditional criminolo-
gists ignore the fact that poverty and exploitation are factors
of crime in America. Radical criminology cannot account for
the rising rates of amoral, nihilistic violence. Finding both
theories wanting, Kelman develops his own theory.
The central idea in Kelman's theory is that crime and
criminals are outputs of society, similar to cars, soybeans, and
31. Id. at 74.
32. Id. at 81.
33. Kelman, The Origins of Crime and Criminal Violence, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW, supra note 1, at 214.
34. Id. at 220, 224.
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engineers. Our economic and social systems produce and dis-
tribute crime by the same mechanisms with which they pro-
duce and distribute these other products. It seems that
America has decided that it is more efficient to bear the costs
of crime (in terms of victims, jails, judges, police, and the like)
than it would be to create opportunities for unskilled, unedu-
cated people.8 America has come to this point, writes Kel-
man, as a result of value choices which measure all aspects of
human life in dollars and cents.86
The materialistic aspect of American law is further se-
verely criticized by Richard Abel in his essay, "Torts. '" Tort
law has evolved, argues Abel, because money has become
equated with "labor, possessions, care, emotional and physical
integrity, and ultimately love."88 The ideal of individualism
has become warped to the point that, as a tort plaintiff, a per-
son is worth what he or she owns.89 Awards for injury and
death actually add value to the gross national product. Social
class, gender, and race have become factors in deciding who
will be most at risk from accidents, while personal injury suits
have become lottery tickets with the winners envied by the
losers and the lawyers skimming money "off the top." By
means of those absurdities, says Abel, the law reinforces bour-
geois ideology. 0
Abel's proposal for a way out of this abyss is to democra-
tize the risk of accidents, instead of merely spreading the
costs. Those most at risk should have the greatest voice in
matters of health and safety. Instead of gambling on compen-
sation for pain and suffering, Abel would limit awards to re-
coveries for property damage and lost earnings. This, he says,
would free up resources to promote equality of compensation,
comprehensive medical care, and adequate income guarantees.
His proposals would stimulate a more egalitarian society and
remove human care and love from the commodities market."1
35. See Rudovsky, The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 242 (only Russia and South Africa imprison a
higher percentage of their population than America).
36. Kelman, supra note 33, at 225-26.
37. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 1,
at 185.
38. Id. at 187.
39. Id. at 190.
40. Id. at 194.
41. Id. at 198-99.
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Attacking some of our core beliefs about the Constitution
and the first amendment, Mark Tushnet, in "Corporations
and Free Speech, '42 observes that speech, like all aspects of
human life in America, is a commodity which has found a
place in the market.4 When speech is regulated only by sup-
ply and demand it becomes merely "another one of the assets
held by the powerful," instead of "a vehicle by which other-
wise powerless people can gain power." A classic example of
wealth buying power through political speech is the case of
Buckley v. Valeo," in which the Supreme Court invalidated
limits placed on political campaign contributions because
"there [is] no overriding interest in 'restrict[ing] the speech of
some ... in order to enhance the relative voice of others
... , ,,4 This case could be used to illustrate the aphorism
that money talks and a lot of money talks loudly.
David Kairys, like Tushnet, thinks that effective commu-
nication is expensive. 47 But this fact is obscured by an aura of
sacredness which cloaks the first amendment. Effective com-
munication, writes Kairys, is never "free." It costs not only
money, but lives as well.' 8 Popular progressive movements
have always paid a price for expressing opposition to the sta-
tus quo. Much of his essay, "Freedom of Speech," chronicles
the repression of dissent in America, from the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts, through the abolition movement, to the bloody
struggles of the Wobblies and the developing labor unions.
Usually, says Kairys, broadening and strengthening the pro-
tections of the first amendment has followed basic shifts in
power and social relations. 9
Kairys points out that judicial opinion is deceptive be-
cause it ignores the political nature of the first amendment.
Judges and scholars have viewed the first amendment as a
facet of American jurisprudence instead of as a creature of so-
cial and economic forces.50 Instead of a dramatic progress to-
42. Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra
note 1, at 253.
43. Id. at 256-57.
44. Id. at 257.
45. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
46. Tushnet, supra note 42, at 259 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, at 48-49).
47. Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLmCS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 140.
48. Id. at 166.
49. Id. at 141.
50. Id. at 161.
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ward liberty and equality, the legal system has created the im-
age of polite discourse among refined people. Instead of being
regarded as a lever, a tool for changing society, free speech has
become a museum piece, to be admired but not utilized.
Kairys continues his expos6 of judicial deception in his
essay on "Legal Reasoning."' When judges claim to apply a
"neutral, objective application of legal expertise" instead of
acknowledging the personal, social, and political values which
are at work, judges commit the "central deception of tradi-
tional jurisprudence."52 The judiciary stands on precedent,
knowing full well that the "various relevant precedents will
provide some support for both sides rather than lead to a par-
ticular rule."5 Courts have only abandoned stare decisis when
"the legitimacy and power of the courts stood to be enhanced
by openly rejecting continuity in favor of politically popular
change." 54 Although he does not state so explicitly, Kairys
seems to think that the harm is not in the political nature of
the judiciary, but in the facade of objectivity used to hide this
political nature.
To conclude, the foregoing highlights some of the most
worthwhile material in this unusual collection. Rand Rosen-
blatt's common-sense socialistic explanation of the holding in
Dandridge v. Williams,55 Peter Gabel and Jay Feinman's idea
that modern contract law embodies an ironic contradiction in
American ideals,56 and Robert Gordon's thought that "[law,
like religion and television images, is one of these clusters of
belief. . . that convince people that all the many hierarchical
relations in which they live and work are natural and neces-
sary," 7 all make for provocative reading, too.
Obviously, this controversial collection of essays is ambi-
tious in scope. Tracing the history of American law provides a
51. Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 11.
52. Id. at 13.
53. Id. at 14.
54. Id. at 16.
55. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) cited in Rosenblatt, Legal Entitlement and Welfare
Benefits, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 270 (the limiting of monthly
grants to welfare families results in denying benefits to children rather than in en-
couraging adults in the work force).
56. Gabel and Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 179-80 (the American ideal of free trade and Horatio Alger does not
apply to the modern law of contracts, where stability and predictability are essential).
57. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 287.
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needed perspective for current problems. But too few of the
authors state in print what can be glimpsed between their
lines: they believe in the perfectability of society and they are
committed to a more just, humane world. Perhaps they take
these beliefs for granted in themselves, but more explicit
statements of this type might have provided a more coherent
overview to the work as a whole.
At its best, as in the essays by Victor Rabinowitz, Karl
Klare, Nadine Taub and Elizabeth Schneider, The Politics of
Law illuminates the pivotal role of the American legal system.
At its best, the book is sensitive to the evolution of our system
toward the ideal of "due process of law." If you believe that
the present historical period involves significant change from
the past and involves a search for greater legitimacy for social
institutions, then The Politics of Law may stimulate your
thinking to better prepare you for the future.

